Trump and CDC trying to DEFLECT the Pandemic of BLAME – America’s Sewage Debacle

YES FOLKS …. China Virus FatBergs

THE HARD CORE FACTS OF THE GREAT AMERICAN SEWAGE FIASCO

AG / Senator Harris gave BJ’s to the Banksters and a PASS to all their CRAP Sewage Messes

Explain to the World what a FATBERG is Ms. Harris maybe DON TRUMP and Joe Biden Care to Explain

.. .. The World’s Massive Sewage Debacle is traceable to the CRAP Sewer and Septic Systems used by the Greedy and Corrupt REALTY INDUSTRY and Their BAR Card Lawyers and Banksters ….. Speculative Realty and Commodes / Sewage all go hand in hand ….. JBW

Flushing America’s Rivers of Death and Disease

SWIMMING IN SEWAGE AMERICA IS

THE REAL TRUTH IS

The Sewage Crisis In America – The Atlantic

https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/…

Sep 17, 2015 · A single 2014 storm triggered a release into Lake Erie from Detroit, Michigan, of more than 44 million gallons of raw sewage from sanitary sewers …

Sewer Crisis in Florida – USA TODAY NETWORK News

Home

These sewage spills are emblematic of failing wastewater systems across Florida, which is grappling with aging infrastructure and no clear solutions for funding a fix. During the past decade, deteriorating sewers have released 1.6 billion gallons of wastewater, much of it polluting the state’s estuaries and oceans, according to a GateHouse Media analysis of state environmental data.

Inside New York City’s plan to clean its sewage-filled …

https://ny.curbed.com/2020/2/20/21144943/new-york…

Feb 20, 2020 · Every time it rains in New York, millions of gallons of sewage-laced stormwater flows into the city’s waterways. Instead of being diverted to a wastewater treatment plant, what goes down your…

PLANETARY SEWAGE CRISIS

GLOBAL DEATH GLOBAL PANDEMIC

COVID Crisis USA Sewage Crisis Earth JUDSON WITHAM

Dedicated to My Mom and Dad, Helen Matot, Lou Macy , Natalie Mark, Jack Bryant, Mickey Luce, Ron Cole, and many of My Friends and Family that MAKE ME KEEP IT REAL JBW

THESE VERY SAME STATES HAVE VAST SEWAGE CRISISES

The States with the Worst Death Rates also have Massive Sewage Problems

Image may contain: text that says 'DISEASE DEATHS PER DAY WORLDWIDE 3,014 Tuberculosis Hepatitis B Pneumonia HIV AIDS Malaria Shigellosis Rotavirus Seasonal Flu Norovirus Cough 2,430 2,216 2,110 2,002 1644 1,233 1,027 548 440 Typhoid 396 Cholera 392 Meningitis 329 Measles 247 Rabies 162 Yellow Fever 82 COVID-19 Coronavirus 56 Leishmaniasis 55 Echinococcosis 53 Dengue Fever 50 Hepatitis A 20 Chicken Pox 12 Sleeping Sickness 10 Ebola 5.3 SARS 3.2 MERS 2.3 SOURCES: CDC, THELANCET LACET-CORRECTASOFMARO9.20 CORRECT WHO.'

THE FACTS DO NOT LIE

Pandemic of SEWAGE North Carolina

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The Sanford Federal Courthouse is the  TIP OF THE ICEBERG
The Case as Featured on Pacer Monitor   5:20  CV  00330 M
North Carolina Eastern District Court Information Pagewww.pacermonitor.com › court › North_Carolina_East…

Witham vBoyle et al Court: North Carolina Eastern District Court Case Num: 5:20cv00330 M. Filed: Jun 19, 2020. Nature of suit: Civil Rights – Other Civil Rights

BoyleSEWAGE.jpg

5:20 cv 00330 M Judge Boyle and the Sewage

Terry Sanford Federal Building discharging sewage into …www.newsobserver.com › news › local › article243241566 Jun 3, 2020 – The Terry Sanford Federal Building in downtown Raleigh has been discharging raw sewage into the local stormwater system and adjoining …You’ve visited this page 2 times. Last visit: 6/13/20


DEQ orders investigation of federal building sewage dischargewww.newsobserver.com › news › local › article243641452 Jun 18, 2020 – The Sanford Federal courthouse and office building has been sending sewage into Walnut Creek for decades.


Raw Sewage from the Terry Sanford Federal Building and …www.gsaig.gov › sites › default › files › audit-reports

PDFJun 3, 2020 – Alert Memorandum: Raw Sewage from the Terry Sanford Federal Building and Courthouse in Raleigh, North Carolina, is Discharging into …


DEQ issues Notice of Violation on Federal Building Sewage …deq.nc.gov › news › press-releases › 2020/06/18 › deq-…


Oversight.gov on Twitter: “New OIG report about GAO: Alert …twitter.com › OversightGov › status

Jun 3, 2020 – New OIG report about GAO: Alert Memorandum: Raw Sewage from the Terry Sanford Federal Building and Courthouse in Raleigh, North …


Wastewater may be next COVID-19 alarm – North Carolina …www.northcarolinahealthnews.org › 2020/06/09 › if-th…

Jun 9, 2020 – The city of Cary’s wastewater treatment plant, where officials are … The Sanford Federal Courthouse Sewage Scandal is the tip of the Iceberg in …


Test finds high E. coli near federal building stormwater outlet …www.heraldsun.com › news › local › article243666422 4 days ago – River keepers have been testing the creek after a report showed the Terry Sanford Federal Building had been spewing sewage into the …


DEQ issues Notice of Violation on Federal Building Sewage …www.einnews.com › pr_news › deq-issues-notice-of-vi…

Jun 18, 2020 – DEQ issues Notice of Violation on Federal Building Sewage Discharge … of wastewater from the Terry Sanford Federal Building in Raleigh.

FLUSHING THE POLLUTION TO ACHIEVE THE DILUTION

The mechanics of the Government and Corporate Poisoning of America and the World Exposed ….. Hiding the Pee and the Pooh too.

GREAT LAKES OF POISON

The Gargantuan Poisoning of America The Government and Corporate CRIME SCENE

The SHITIEST STORY in World History

The Terry Sanford Federal Courthouse Raleigh NC THE EPICENTER of the Cover Up

www.sciencedirect.com › science › article › pii Although there is a substantial body of literature characterizing the microbial community found in wastewater, only a few studies have characterized the viral component of WTC aerosols, despite the fact that most diseases affecting WTC workers are of viral origin and that some of these viruses are transmitted through …

Maybe the Scientists and the Nations Governments want to discuss BIO TERRORISM being perpetrated during this Epidemic / Pandemic ….. YEAH BIO TERRORISM and the State and Feds ……. https://www.google.com/search?q=Sewage+Bio+Terror&rlz=1C1NDCM_enUS857US857&oq=Sewage+Bio+Terror+&aqs=chrome..69i57.6251j0j8&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8

From NEW YORK and all over New England, across the United States and around the World ….. The BIO TERROR of Sewage Overflows and FLUSHING THE POLLUTION


The Indoors Air is INFECTED

Lets examine AIRBORNE Viruses

What won’t open right away: indoor movie theaters, gyms and fitness centers, and malls.

“We’re looking at what happened in other states,” Cuomo said. “That air conditioning may not be cleansing the air of the virus, just recirculating the virus. As soon as we get more data we will make an informed decision.”

Aviation Mall responds to Cuomo’s refusal to open malls …poststar.com › news › local › aviation-mall-responds-to-c… Jun 10, 2020 – Pyramid, which owns Aviation Mall, issued a statement saying that if HVAC systems spread coronavirus, it can’t be worse in a mall than in a …

COVID-19: How much protection do face masks offer? – Mayo …www.mayoclinic.org › coronavirus-mask › art-20485449

May 28, 2020 – Face masks may help slow the spread of the coronavirus. … breathes out, this type of mask doesn’t prevent the wearer from spreading the virus.


LETS EXAMINE SOME SCIENCE ……. I am OSHA 10&30 certified. I know some of you are too. I don’t really know WHY OSHA hasn’t come forward and stopped the nonsense BUT I want to cover 3 things
• N95 masks and masks with exhale ports
• surgical masks
• filter or cloth masks
Okay, so upon further inspection, OSHA says some masks are okay and not okay in certain situations.
If you’re working with fumes and aerosol chemicals and you give your employees the wrong masks and they get sick, you can be sued.
• N95 masks: are designed for CONTAMINATED environments. That means when you exhale through N95 the design is that you are exhaling into contamination. The exhale from N95 masks are vented to breath straight out without filtration. They don’t filter the air on the way out. They don’t need to.
Conclusion: if you’re in Target and the guy with Covid has a N95 mask, his covid breath is unfiltered being exhaled into Target (because it was designed for already contaminated environments, it’s not filtering your air on the way out).
• Surgical Mask: these masks were designed and approved for STERILE environments. The amount of particles and contaminants in the outside and indoor environments where people are CLOGGING these masks very, VERY quickly. The moisture from your breath combined with the clogged mask will render it “useless” IF you come in contact with Covid and your mask traps it, YOU become a walking virus dispenser. Everytime you put your mask on you are breathing the germs from EVERYWHERE you went. They should be changed or thrown out every “20-30 minutes in a non sterile environment.”
• Cloth masks: I can’t even believe I’m having to explain this, but here it goes. Today, three people pointed to their masks as they walked by me entering Lowe’s. They said “ya gotta wear your mask BRO” I said very clearly “those masks don’t work bro, in fact they MAKE you sicker” they “pshh’d” me. By now hopefully you all know CLOTH masks do not filter anything. You mean the American flag one my aunt made? Yes. The one with sunflowers that looks so cute? Yes. The bandanna, the cut up t-shirt, the scarf ALL of them offer NO FILTERING whatsoever. As you exhale, you are ridding your lungs of contaminants and carbon dioxide. Cloth masks trap this carbon dioxide the best. It actually risks your health, rather than protect it. The moisture caught in these masks can become mildew ridden over night. Dry coughing, enhanced allergies, sore throat are all symptoms of a micro-mold in your mask.
-Ultimate Answer:
*N95 blows the virus into the air from a contaminated person.
*The surgical mask is not designed for the outside world and will not filter the virus upon inhaling through it. It’s filtration works on the exhale, (Like a vacuum bag, it only works one way) but likely stops after 20 minutes, rendering it useless outside of a STERILE ENVIRONMENT (correct Becky, they don’t work in a bar, not even a little bit).
*Cloth masks are WORSE than none. It’s equivalent to using a chain link fence to stop mosquitos.
The CDC wants us to keep wearing masks. The masks don’t work. They’re being used to provide false comfort and push forward a specific agenda. For the love of God, research each mask’s designed use and purpose, I bet you will find NONE are used in the way of “viral defense.”
Just like EVERY Flu season kids, wash your hands. Sanitize your hands. Don’t touch stuff. Sanitize your phone. Don’t touch people. And keep your distance. Why? Because your breath stinks, your deodorant is failing, your shoes are old and stink, that shirts not clean, & I like my space. Trust me I can hear you from here. Lots of reasons to keep your distance and work on body hygiene. But trust me, the masks do not work.
*Occupational Safety & Hazard Association sited.
The top American organization for safety.
They regulate and educate asbestos workers, surgical rooms, you name it.
I know, facts suck. They throw a wrench into the perfectly (seeming) packaged pill you are willingly swallowing. Facts make you have to form your OWN OPINION, instead of regurgitating someone else’s, and I know how uncomfortable that makes a lot of you. If your mask gives you security, by all means wear it. Just know it is a false sense of security and you shouldn’t shame anyone into partaking in such “conspiracies.”
If select politicians stopped enforcing it, no one would continue this nonsense.”

Good time to discuss the IMMENSE EMMISSIONS of Toxins in the Air during this PANDEMIC as well ….. Imagine TERRORISM and AIR POLLUTION …… Population Control Perhaps …… JBW

The Hard Cold Facts are extremely simple …. American Politics is a SEWER of Money and Sophistries designed to Profit while at the same time OBFUSCATION of the Facts and Truth ( AKA Fake News ) and propaganda are employed to CONCEAL and WHITEWASH the TRUTH …..

Judson Witham

Lake George Warrior / Glens Falls Indian – SON OF THE SWAMP FOXES

Pathogen Surveillance Through Monitoring of Sewer Systems www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov › pmc › articles › PMC7112011

Respiratory infections are usually the result of replication of the organism in the nose, throat, or lungs. Infection of other organs of the body often leads to the …

It is now possible to monitor sewage systems for pathogen occurrence in a community. An epidemiological approach to monitoring sewer systems is especially relevant for an early warning of pathogens used as biological weapons. In many situations, bioterrorist contamination events will result in the pathogen shedding to wastewater before a community level epidemic begins. Detecting the organism early allows the governments to respond on time and eliminate a potential catastrophe.

Terrorism and Security Issues Facing the Water Infrastructure …fas.org › sgp › crs › terror

PDFdischarged millions of gallons of untreated sewage during the emergency, and … Since the 2001 terrorist attacks, many water and wastewater utilities have …by C Copeland – ‎2010 – ‎Cited by 71 – ‎Related articles


Bioterrorism and Terrorism :: Washington State Department of …www.doh.wa.gov › Emergencies › Be Prepared, Be Safe

Describes diseases that could be spread intentionally through an act of terrorism and what can be done to prevent and respond to such acts.


Sewage Spills: Cleaning Them Up :: Washington State …www.doh.wa.gov › SevereWeatherandNaturalDisasters

Thorough cleaning of indoor sewage spills is necessary to protect people — especially small children — from harmful bacteria and viruses. Clean-up should …


Water and terrorism – Pacific Institutewww2.pacinst.org › reports › water_terrorism

PDFWater and wastewater treatment plants dot our urban and rural landscape. What is less clear, however, is how significant such threats are today, compared with …by PH Gleick – ‎2006 – ‎Cited by 208 – ‎Related articles


America’s hidden terrorist labyrinth: Sewerage systems …www.chicagotribune.com › news › ct-xpm-2003-05-27…

May 27, 2003 – Since the terrorist attacks of Sept. … The sewers connect to 16000 wastewater treatment plants, many of which store large amounts of toxic …


GAO-05-165, Wastewater Facilities: Experts’ Views on How …www.gao.gov › assets

These facilities, however, may possess certain characteristics that terrorists could exploit either to impair the wastewater treatment process or to damage …

Right under Everyone’s Feet ….. Infectious Sewage

SEWAGE SEWAGE SEWAGE SEWAGE SEWAGE

The MANY LIES of Social Distancing

Exposure Pathways to High-Consequence Pathogens in the …cfpub.epa.gov › si_public_file_download

PDFEstimated Bioaerosol Concentration Range for Bacterial or Viral Wastewater. Pathogens with … turbulent movement of sewage and may generate aerosols.


Wastewater Aerosols and Health Risks – jstorwww.jstor.org › stable

By the time raw wastewater reaches a treatment plant, it can contain a myriad of potentially hazardous agents?parasites, bacteria, viruses, and chem icals?that …by DV Feliciano – ‎1979 – ‎Cited by 4 – ‎Related articles

The MASKS do Not Prevent Inhale or Exhale and DO NOT Stop the Viruses in Human Breath ….. The MASKS DO NOT WORK

Well, THERE’s your ‘beta-test’ results ferya…. masks and distancing work ! So….the next time the government tried to shut down all our businesses … we must NOT let them ! We have beat the ‘flu figures’ well enough so our citizenry must never again be threatened with bankruptcy that this sort of “problem” has caused so many ! (despite the fact that there are about 1000 bio-warfare labs in the world, right ?). Dr. Robert Redfield, the director of the CDC, told reporters that the true number of cases was probably 10 times the official count.

BUSINESSINSIDER.COMUS sets another record for new coronavirus cases, with a single-day total above 39,000

THE VIRUSES ARE AIRBORNE and in GOVERNMENT SEWERS / SEWAGE

Aviation Mall
Aviation Mall has been largely closed since March due to the coronavirus shutdown. While businesses with exterior entrances are open, the mall itself is still not allowed to reopen.File photo

Gee Golly Whiz right there in GLENS FALLS / QUEENSBURY Ole Judson’s STOMPING GROUNDS and Yeah even the POST STAR OMG

Aviation Mall officials were not happy to hear that Gov. Andrew Cuomo thinks air conditioning units might be unsafe.

Cuomo said Wednesday that he won’t let malls reopen until he knows more about whether air conditioners recirculate coronavirus in the air.

But mall officials immediately noted that other big businesses, like Target, have been open with air conditioning.

They sent out a statement Thursday from Pyramid Management Group, which owns the Queensbury mall.

“While we can appreciate the state’s concern about the public’s health and safety, any reporting that suggests that HVAC systems within enclosed shopping centers are more likely to distribute the virus than HVAC systems within restaurants, barber shops, office buildings, museums and freestanding retailers already open like Target, Walmart, Hobby Lobby, TJ Maxx (and others) is simply false,” the statement said. “The quality of overall air circulation in our shopping centers, which also benefit from considerable open and airy corridors, is as good or better than those venues that have been allowed to reopen.”

The statement cited a Healthline story of a case in a restaurant in China in which people are believed to have caught the virus from the air flow powered by the air conditioning. The story said that no similar cases had been found, which is not exactly true.

Viruses are carried in Exhaled Breath

Infectious virus in exhaled breath of symptomatic seasonal …www.pnas.org › contentJan 18, 2018 – Lack of human data on influenza virus aerosol shedding fuels debate over the importance of airborne transmission. We provide overwhelming …

Influenza Virus Aerosols in Human Exhaled Breath: Particle S …journals.lww.com › epidem › fulltext › Influenza_Virus_…Influenza Virus Aerosols in Human Exhaled Breath: Particle Size, Culturability, and Effect of Surgical Masks. Fabian, Patricia 1; Milton, Donald 2; Angel, Matthew …

Globalization and infectious diseases – World Health …www.who.int › tdr › publications › documents › seb_topic3 PDF3 • Globalization and infectious diseases: A review of the linkages v … instance, human waste and effluent can easily contaminate dams. … in the autumn of 2001 highlighted the threat posed by the use of infectious agents for terrorist purposes

Bioterrorism and Biocrimes – Federation Of American Scientistsfas.org › irp › threat › cbw › carus

PDF Aug 20, 1998 – This is the eighth revision of a working paper on biological terrorism first … hand, Ava believed that it might be a mixture of raw sewage taken …

CDC Trump Laying the Blame

SwampFox <notjuris@gmail.com>Tue, Jun 23, 9:53 PM (11 hours ago)
to editor, Anna, danny.smith, opinion, contact, saranaclake, Travis, John, Jeff, dec.sm.Info.R5, Esq., Annette, georgia, Sarah, DanielTedford, bcc: Jacqueline, bcc: Kim

What is  twisted and sickening is very simple,   The Nations  Health Departments and Environmental Protection Agencies with EPA have done a  CRIMINALLY ROTTEN JOB  Protecting the Nation’s  Health and National Security. The PANDEMIC and SEWAGE CRISIS are directly connected.  

President Trump and the CDC need to  GET REAL

How sewage could reveal true scale of coronavirus outbreakwww.nature.com › news Apr 3, 2020 – Covert coronavirus infections could be seeding new outbreaks. But to quantify the scale of infection in a population from wastewater samples, …

Pathogen Surveillance Through Monitoring of Sewer Systems www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov › pmc › articles › PMC7112011

Respiratory infections are usually the result of replication of the organism in the nose, throat, or lungs.  Infection of other organs of the body often leads to the …

SEWAGE CRISIS 101 the Epidemic EXPOSED

TRACK AND TRACE ALL THE SEWAGE The PIGS across MURICA Exposed  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wxfECz9S2Tc&t=174s


Donald Trump’s  BLAME GAME with the CDC  leaves huge FACTUAL GAPS  and  avoids the REALITY.

apoisonedlake.jpg

The ACTUAL  BLAME LAYS with  Federal Entities  LIKE the Terry Sanders Federal Courts Building and  WORMS like Judge Terrence W. Boyle and many other Federal Judges and Government Operators of America’s Sewers.


Hiding the  Pee and the  Pooh Too.


Perhaps  The Hill and the Whitehouse  Press Team would like to ADDRESS THE  FACTS ?

The real pandemic driven by  a VAST SEWAGE DEBACLE from Wuhan China to the United States and many other Nations around the World.    YES  Infectious  Human Sewage.

The Pictures do NOT LIE

Pictures Pictures Pictures

https://www.facebook.com/groups/593885501262708
Government Viruses Government Sewage Government Killing Machines

Isacc Witham's photo.

It’s time for an ACCURATE and  SCIENTIFICALLY CORRECT  discussion on  the World’s Pandemic

TrumpsSewage.jpg

PICTURES  AND VIDEOS ARE WORTH THOUSANDS OF WORDS

Champlain2.jpg


Terry Sanford Federal Building discharging sewage into …www.newsobserver.com › news › local › article243241566 Jun 3, 2020 – The Raleigh federal office building and courthouse near the State Capitol has been … photo, the federal building in Raleigh, N.C.’s new name, the Terry Sanford Federal Building, is unveiled. … Judson Witham 

www.newsobserver.com › news › local › article243641452 6 days ago – The Sanford Federal courthouse and office building has been sending sewage into Walnut Creek for decades. The NC Department of …


DEQ issues Notice of Violation on Federal Building Sewage …deq.nc.gov › news › press-releases › 2020/06/18 › deq-…

6 days ago – … U.S. General Services Administration (GSA) for the unauthorized discharge of wastewater from the Terry Sanford Federal Building in Raleigh.


Raleigh federal building has been sending sewage into …www.msn.com › en-us › news › raleigh-federal-buildin…

Jun 3, 2020 – RALEIGH — The Terry Sanford Federal Building in downtown Raleigh has been discharging raw sewage into the local stormwater system and …You’ve visited this page 3 times. Last visit: 6/17/20


Raw Sewage from the Terry Sanford Federal Building and …www.gsaig.gov › print


Raw Sewage from the Terry Sanford Federal Building and …www.oversight.gov › sites › default › files › oig-reports

PDFJun 3, 2020 – Alert Memorandum: Raw Sewage from the Terry Sanford Federal Building and Courthouse in Raleigh, North Carolina, is Discharging into …


Wastewater may be next COVID-19 alarm – North Carolina …www.northcarolinahealthnews.org › 2020/06/09 › if-th…

Jun 9, 2020 – The Sanford Federal Courthouse Sewage Scandal is the tip of the Iceberg in North Carolina. Ole Judson Witham is litigating the Giant Mess at the …

https://www.npr.org/…/the-gulf-of-mexicos-dead-zone-is-the-…


https://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2017/08/03/541222717/the-gulf-of-mexicos-dead-zone-is-the-biggest-ever-seen

Lake George Sewage Flushing – Page Profile – Spreelywww.spreely.com › page › LakeGeorgeFlusherGate

Jun 12, 2020 – The HORRID Truth SANFORD FEDERAL COURTHOUSE SwampFox 8:48 AM (58 minutes ago) to Jeff Mr. Sipes, As the State of North …You’ve visited this page many times. Last visit: 5/20/20


overview for JudsonWitham – Redditwww.reddit.com › user › JudsonWitham

Broken pipe spills 176,000 gallons of sewage into Durham waterway feeding Falls Lake … THE SANFORD FEDERAL COURTHOUSE is an extreme example of …


Jud Witham – Jud Witham – YouTubewww.youtube.com › channel

YouTube CENSORED ME because Google and YouTube are CROOKED BASTARDS …… Uploads from Judson Witham Judson Witham “No videos” 19698 …


NEW YORK’s Toilet Lakes Toilet Rivers …. The VIRUSES Of New Yorkadirondackslakegeorgefreepress.wordpress.com › new-…

The North Carolina Federal Judiciary BAR and the US Marshals FBI and all the Court Personnel … Just a Little Sewage FILLED with Millions of VIRUSES and BACTERIA … and ENGINEERS absolutely corroborate JUDSON WITHAM’s FINDINGS … Subsequently, in 2009, the Circuit Court ordered the legal winter level to be …


JUDSON WITHAM COLLEGE OF HISTORIC AND ECONOMIC …ne-np.facebook.com › groups

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JUDSON WITHAM COLLEGE OF HISTORIC AND ECONOMIC STUDIES सँग ८१७ जना सदस्यहरू छन्। Facts are … NC DEQ orders investigation of decades-long sewage discharge from Sanford building … FILED AGAIN TODAY In Fed Court in Raleigh NC . … COM. Attention State and Federal Judges and LEOs.


Shinplaster Hocus Pocus Fiat Scrip – 帖子| Facebookzh-cn.facebook.com › posts
6月13日16:56 ·. youtube.com. The Turds of Sanford Federal Courthouse Raleigh NC … combined sewage overflow judson witham – Google Search. 赞评论分享 …


Symposium Proceedings Wastewater Aerosols And Disease …nepis.epa.gov › Exe › ZyPURL

WITHAM: Was your study based on any of your own data? DR. FANNIN: This is an overview, a presentation of various meth- ods as an introduction to

TONS OF VIDEOS REVEAL THE FACTS

Search Results

Poisoning Lake Champlain FLUSHING Lake George – Law …
https://laymanslaw.home.blog › poisoning-lake-champlain-flushing-lake-geo…▶ 19:01
Flushing the Sewage and Mill Wastes and Cesspool known as Lake George is REALITY. … Aug 10, 2015 …Apr 13, 2018 – Uploaded by Jud Witham

The Viruses and Sewage Lake George Lake Champlain New …
https://adirondackslakegeorgefreepress.wordpress.com › the-viruses-and-sew…▶ 5:13
The Viruses and Sewage Lake George Lake Champlain New York’s Sewage Flushing Leachate and Brown …Jun 11, 2020 – Uploaded by Jud WithamYou’ve visited this page 2 times. Last visit: 6/13/20

3M gallons of partially treated wastewater released into Lake …
https://www.mynbc5.com › article › 3m-gallons-of-partially-treated-sewage-…▶ 2:02
An equipment failure Tuesday night caused 3 million gallons of partially treated wastewater to be released into …Jul 12, 2018

Lake George New York … Lake Champlain NY POISONING …
https://adirondackslakegeorgefreepress.wordpress.com › lake-george-lake-ch…▶ 5:10
Warren County , Queensbury and New York DEC / LGPC CAN’T FLUSH THIS … Sewage Flushing Poisoning …Oct 2, 2019 – Uploaded by Jud Witham

The Poisoning of Lake Champlain ….. 800 TONS Daily for …
https://theadirondacksconspiracy.wordpress.com › 2015/08/10 › the-poiso…

▶ 11:19 THE POISONING OF LAKE GEORGE AND LAKE CHAMPLAIN … FLUSHING Lake George’s Sewage …Aug 10, 2015 – Uploaded by Jud Witham

Equipment failure triggers spill at Burlington sewage plant
https://www.burlingtonfreepress.com › story › news › 2018/04/18 › valve-fa…▶ 1:12
Partially treated sewage, combined with surges of stormwater, flowed into Lake Champlain from Burlington …Apr 18, 2018

Lake George NY … Flushing The Lake’s Sewage and …
https://adirondackslakegeorgefreepress.wordpress.com › lake-george-ny-flus…▶ 2:56
Mar 4, 2019 – Sewage Flushing Poisoning Lake George Lake Champlain – Google … Images of flushing …Oct 17, 2019 – Uploaded by Jud Witham

Another 1.1M gallons of partially treated sewage released into …
https://www.mynbc5.com › article › another-11m-gallons-of-partially-treate…▶ 2:01
Another 1.1 million gallons of partially treated sewage was released into Lake Champlain this week. The …Jun 6, 2018Stay up to date on results for flush sewage lake champlain.

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Pathogen Surveillance Through Monitoring of Sewer Systems

Ryan G. Sinclair,*,1Christopher Y. Choi,Mark R. Riley, and Charles P. Gerba*Author informationCopyright and License informationDisclaimerThis article has been cited by other articles in PMC.Go to:

I. INTRODUCTION

It is now possible to monitor sewage systems for pathogen occurrence in a community. An epidemiological approach to monitoring sewer systems is especially relevant for an early warning of pathogens used as biological weapons. In many situations, bioterrorist contamination events will result in the pathogen shedding to wastewater before a community level epidemic begins. Detecting the organism early allows the governments to respond on time and eliminate a potential catastrophe.

A. Monitoring for human pathogens in sewage

Monitoring of human pathogens in sewage is possible because they may be excreted in a range of bodily fluids, skin, and hair during active infection (Feachem et al., 1983). All of these materials will find their way into sewage systems during the process of waste elimination (toilet flushing) and cleaning (e.g., bathing, hand washing). In addition to release during active infection, pathogens can be washed into sewage systems from cleaning of indoor (floor washing, kitchen sink use) and outdoor (auto washing, driveway cleaning, storm water collection) facilities. Thus, sewer systems collect pathogens from over a wide area to a common carrier, where they are transported to a central facility for processing.

Wastewater presents a time dynamic collection point where many physical, chemical, and biological substances of our society are brought to a central location. Monitoring of centralized wastewater allows detection of intentional, natural, or accidental contamination events. Because of recent bioterrorism concerns in the U.S., routine monitoring is potentially useful since it can result in better preparedness of utilities and the public health response system (Meinhardt, 2005). The qualitative microbial risk assessment (QMRA) framework can be used as a tool to develop and interpret this type of wastewater monitoring system. Because the threat level drives the risk assessment analysis, a monitoring system should be coordinated with findings from modeling studies on the survival and dispersion of contaminants (Kim et al., 2007Romero et al., 2008Sinclair et al., 2008), the contaminant point of introduction (Danneels and Finley, 2004), the health risk (Haas et al., 1999), and the locations of early warning systems/sensors in wastewater and water treatment systems (Murray et al., 2004).

A recent U.S. National Research Council study called for more resilient design/operation of wastewater and drinking water systems (USNRC, 2007) to improve response and recovery from adverse water quality events in collection systems, water distribution systems, and water/wastewater treatment systems. Monitoring programs for pathogens or surrogates could potentially aid in the accomplishment of these goals. The aim of this review of published literature and reports is to assess the feasibility of monitoring sewage systems as an early warning system for the release of pathogens from an intentional, natural, or accidental biological contamination event. We address issues from a QMRA perspective and explore methods to detect and monitor pathogens in wastewater. The review presents our conclusions on: (1) the potential biological agents that might be released into a sewage system, (2) the likely background level of those agents in sewage, (3) laboratory methods and detection, and (4) the probability of detecting select biological agents in sewage.Go to:

II. POTENTIAL BIOLOGICAL AGENTS IN SEWAGE

A wide variety of pathogenic organisms pass through municipal waste-water treatment systems. One study found that a single toilet flush containing poliovirus was detectable at a nearby treatment plant for more than 4 days (Ranta et al., 2001). The toilet flush study was designed to replicate the number of virus released from an infected individual. Pathogenic microorganisms can also grow in the host but not produce sickness in the infected host. It is estimated that 50% or less of those individuals infected with enteric viruses or bacteria actually become ill (Haas et al., 1999). In the case of some respiratory pathogens, 90% or more of the persons infected will become ill (Belshe, 1991).

During the growth of the organism in the host, the organism will be found in various organs and bodily fluids. Organisms transmitted by the fecal–oral route are usually excreted in large numbers in the feces, since the initial or primary site of replication is in the intestinal tract. However, this does not preclude their replication in other parts of the body. For example, enteroviruses (e.g., poliovirus) will replicate in nerve tissue causing paralytic disease, while Hepatitis A virus will replicate in the liver causing damage there (Belshe, 1991). Respiratory infections are usually the result of replication of the organism in the nose, throat, or lungs. Infection of other organs of the body often leads to the presence of the organisms in the blood and then the urine after their elimination by the kidneys. This explains the occurrence of insect-borne encephalitis viruses and enteric viruses in the urine (Pichichero et al., 1998). Any type of infection (Fig. 9.1 ) within a community is likely to lead to pathogen excretion in bodily fluids/substances and therefore, transported into the community sewage system.Figure 9.1

Outcomes of exposure to a microbial infection.

This review considers biological agents prioritized by the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) as potential biological weapons that could be used by terrorists (Table 9.1 and 9.2 ). They are listed in three categories (i.e., A, B, and C) of decreasing concern. Category A agents require the most intensive public preparedness efforts due to the potential for mass causalities, public fear, and civil disruption. Category B agents are also moderately easy to spread, but have lower mortality rates. Category C agents do not present a high public health threat, but could emerge as future threats (Rotz et al., 2002). Many other pathogenic agents are present in sewage, but not on the CDC select agent list. Table 9.2 lists some common blood and respiratory agents and emerging pathogens, all of which could potentially be engineered for mass dissemination and detected through monitoring of wastewater. The methods described in this paper apply to many other pathogens and are not limited to those agents listed in Tables 9.1 and 9.2.

Table 9.1

The center for disease control select agents (Rotz et al., 2002)

Category ACategory BCategory C
Anthrax
 Bacillus anthracis
Botulism
 Clostridium botulinum
Plague
 Yersinia pestis
Smallpox
 Variola major
Tularemia
 Francisella
 tularensis
Hemorrhagic fever virusa
 Arenaviridae
 Bunyaviridae
 Filoviridae
 Flaviviridae
 Lassa fever
 Hantavirus
 Dengue fever
 Ebola
 Marburg
Brucellosis
 Brucella abortus
Water and Food-borne agents
 Enteroviruses
 Poliovirus and
 Rotavirus
 Salmonellosis
 Salmonella
 Caliciviruses
 Hepatitis A virus
 Protozoan parasites
 Cryptosporidium parvum
 Giardia lamblia
 Toxoplasma
 Microsporidium
Glanders
 Burkholderia mallei
Psittacosis
 Chlamydia psittaci
Q fever
 Coxiella burnetii
Typhus fever
 Rickettsia prowazekii
Viral Encephalitis
 West Nile
 La Crosse
 Venezuelan equine encephalitis
 Japanese encephalitis
Nipah virus
Tick-borne HFV
Crimean-Congo HFV
Tick-borne encephalitis viruses
Yellow fever
Multidrug resistant TB
Influenza
Other Rickettsias
Rabies

Open in a separate windowaHemorrhagic fever virus (HFV).

Table 9.2

Nonenteric pathogens found in sewage and other emerging agents of concern

Nonenteric agentsEmerging agents
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS)Parvoviruses
John Cunningham virus (JC Virus)Picobirnaviruses
Human Immuno-deficiency Virus (HIV)Enteroviruses types 78–100
Hepatitis B Virus (HBV)Torque teno virus (TTV)

A. Human pathogens secreted in bodily fluids

A literature search was conducted to determine the occurrence of the agents in bodily fluids, feces, skin, and sewage. As indicated in Table 9.3 and a previous publication (Sinclair et al., 2008), many select agents may occur in bodily excretions or secretions even though this may not be their primary site of replication. It would appear that all of the viral agents are excreted in the urine and most of the bacterial agents in the feces or saliva. Since none of the organisms cause enteric infections they have seldom been sought in sewage, however, Bacillus anthracis and Yersina pestis (plague) have been detected in sewage. The source of Banthracis spores in the sewage was believed to be from an African import tannery operation (Perone and Gelosa, 1982) and presumably not from enteric infections, which would normally result in the presence of spores in the feces. Category B agents differ in that, and they include many enteric pathogens which are excreted in large numbers in the feces (Table 9.3). All of the other agents in this category appear to be excreted in the feces; many of the viral agents are excreted in the urine. No studies were found that report examining sewage for their presence. The Category C viral agents appear to be excreted in the saliva and urine (Tables 9.3 and 9.4 ). No references for the presence of these agents in sewage could be found. Some typical blood-borne agents such as Hepatitis B virus (Alter et al., 1977) and Human Immuno-Deficiency virus (Levy, 1989) have been detected in sewage by molecular methods (Table 9.4). The coronavirus, which causes Severe Acute Respiratory Disease (SARS), is also excreted in the feces and other bodily fluids such as tears (Loon et al., 2004Wang et al., 2005) (Table 9.4).

Table 9.3

Select category B and C agents found in human bodily fluids and sewage

AgentCategoryUrineFecesSalivaSewageReference
C. psittaciB?Yesa??Midura and Arnon (1976)Anderson (1996)Smith et al. (2005)
C. burnetiiBYesYesb??Tylewska-Wierzbanowska and Kruszewska (1993)
Viral encephalitisBYesYesc??Mathur et al. (1995)
Nipah virusCYes?Yes?Chua et al., (2002)
RabiesCYes?Yes?Wacharapluesadee and Hemachudha (2002)
InfluenzaC?YescYes?Buchy et al. (2007)

aNasal.bSemen.cAnimals.

Table 9.4

Occurrence of other agents of interest in bodily fluids

AgentsUrineFecesSalivaSewageReference
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome?YesYes?He et al. (2007)Petrich et al. (2006)
John Cunningham virus (poliovirus)Yes??YesColeman et al. (1980)
Human Immuno-deficiency VirusYesYesYesYesLevy (1989)Yolken et al. (1991)
Hepatitis B virus??YesYesAlter et al. (1977)Bancroft et al. (1977)Arvanitidou et al. (1998)

B. Duration of release and concentration in bodily fluids and skin

The duration and concentration of pathogens released by a host during the course of an infection varies, with greater numbers being released in more severe infections. After infection, the number of organisms released usually rises rapidly reaching a peak when the symptoms appear in symptomatic infections. This is usually followed with a long decline in the amount of agent released by the host as long as death does not occur. For example, poliovirus appears in the throat and feces 7–10 days before clinical illness (fever) is apparent and may be excreted for more than 30 days after infection (Fig. 9.2 ). Poliovirus will also be detectable in the blood and urine during the course of infection (Pichichero et al., 1998). Hepatitis A virus appears in the stool of infected individuals 2–3 weeks before clinical illness (Belshe, 1991). Parainfluenza, a virus related to influenza, can be detected in nasal secretions in less than 24 h after infection and up to 2 weeks afterward (Belshe, 1991). In the case of SARS, the virus may still be present in the feces for 37 days after infection (Holmes, 2003). Variola major, the virus that causes smallpox, is released for up to 19 days after infection at concentrations of 102–105 per ml of urine (Table 9.5 ) (Sarkar et al., 1973). In many infections, the greatest concentrations are released during the first few days after the initial infection. Brucella abortus is excreted in concentrations as high as 106 per ml of urine for up to 12 weeks (Table 9.6 ). Marburg virus and flaviviruses are excreted in the urine of animals for 10–12 days. In summary, all of the nonenteric agents of interest (Categories A, B, and C) are released in the host for at least days to weeks in concentrations likely to be detectable in sewage systems (Table 9.6) (Sinclair et al., 2008).Figure 9.2

Occurrence of nonpolio enterovirus in bodily fluids and feces during the course of infection (interpreted from Pichichero et al., 1998).

Table 9.5

Concentration of select agents in sewage and duration of agent release after infection of individuals. see Sinclair et al., (2008) for the following category A agents: Variola major, Hantavirus, Marburg virus, and Flavivirus

AgentCategoryFluidConcentrationaDurationReference
C. BotulinumAFeces108?Paton et al. (1983)
C. PsittaciBFeces102–10328 daysbTakahashi et al. (1988)
B. AbortusBUrine102–1068–12 weeksBicknell and Bell (1979)Carmichael and Joubert (1988)Serikawa et al. (1981)
Japanese encephalitisBUrine1–43 daysMathur et al. (1995)
EnterovirusesBFeces108–1012Weeks to MonthsMaier et al. (2000)
ProtozoaBFeces106–107Weeks to MonthsMaier et al. (2000)
C. BurnetiiBFeces103–1047 daysTylewska-Wierzbanowska and Kruszewska (1993)
InfluenzaCNasal105–1075 days to WeeksBelshe (1991)

aper “milliliter” of volume or “gram” of solid.bAnimals.

Table 9.6

Titer of smallpox virus in urine (Sarkar et al., 1973)

Days after infectionTiter(mL)
3103–105
4102–105
5102–104
6101–104
7101–103
8101–102
10101–102
15101–102
19101
200

Most of the existing data on the occurrence and concentration of pathogens was gathered using culture of viable or infective organisms. Molecular methods such as the polymerase chain reaction (PCR) or immuno-chemical methods (enzyme-linked immunoassays or ELISA) can detect both infectious and noninfectious organisms. These molecular techniques can detect concentrations from 1 to 10,000 greater than culture methods because some of the organisms may be inactivated (dead) or may not be able to grow on the selected media (bacteria) or cell culture (used for viruses). In the case of enteric viruses, the ratio of viruses detected by infectivity assay may be 100–50,000 times less than that detected by a molecular method (Ward et al., 1984). This is because cell culture methods have a low efficiency in virus quantification from clinical and environmental samples; however, they do provide a robust measure of viral activity not feasible with molecular methods.

Agents causing enteric and respiratory infections are released in large numbers in feces and respiratory secretions (Table 9.4). Many of the enteric viruses such as the enteroviruses and adenoviruses may replicate both in the intestinal and respiratory tract. Using molecular methods the number of enteric viruses detected can approach peak concentrations of 1012 organisms per gram of stool while protozoa can approach 106-107 per gram. Cultivatable enteric bacterial pathogens such as Salmonella may also occur in concentrations as large as 1011 per gram (Feachem et al., 1983). By infectivity assays, the concentration of respiratory viruses ranges from 105 to 107 per ml of respiratory secretion. Even blood-borne viruses such as HIV will be found in the feces of infected persons (Ansari et al., 1992) and it appears that many viruses will occur in the urine during infection of the host (Table 9.6), although these excreted viruses may not be infectious. Little information is available on the concentration of pathogenic viruses or bacterial agents of interest in the urine. The total amount of virus released by a person is, of course, also related to the amount of feces, urine, respiratory secretion, and skin that is released by the person. On average, a person excretes between 100 to 400 g of feces and 700–2000 ml of urine per day (Table 9.7 ).

Table 9.7

Factors that affect concentration of the biological agent in sewage

Site of replication in the host GI, upper respiratory, nose, skin, internal organs
Duration of release from the host
Concentration in the source
Incidence of disease in the population
Water use per capita
Season
Survival in the sewer system

A person with an enteric viral infection may excrete as many as 1014 viral particles per day and over 1015 during the course of an infection (Table 9.8 ). Nonenteric bacterial agents of interest appeared to be released in concentrations from 10° to 108 by viability assays (Boone and Gerba 2007). Respiratory pathogens end up in the feces from the swallowing of secretions.

Table 9.8

Sources of biological agents in sewers (Feachem et al., 1983)

Feces (100–400 g/person/day)
Urine (700–2000 ml/day)
Skin—from bath and hand washing
Saliva, respiratory secretions
Blood
Food
Wash water (kitchen, drains)
Storm watera

aSome sewer systems are combined with the storm-water collection system.

Ecological studies of bovine tuberculosis in badgers introduce the concept of “super-excretors,” which maintain the disease and pass infectious organisms in their stool or urine continuously. Super-excretors are individuals who excrete larger numbers than average of a pathogen during an infection. These super-excretors were almost exclusively animals with a progressive infection, which does not resolve and contributed to a higher mortality (Delahay et al., 2000). The occurrence of a similar “super-spreader” was also noted in a clinical epidemiological report of SARS in humans (Holmes, 2003).Go to:

III. CONCENTRATION OF BIOLOGICAL AGENTS IN SEWAGE

The occurrence and concentration of pathogens in sewage is dependent upon a number of factors listed in Table 9.9 . One of the most important considerations is the amount of pathogen released by a person daily from bodily fluid, feces, skin, and urine. Because one infected individual typically produces at least 100 g of feces per day, a pathogen present at 108 per gram will introduce at least 1010 or more of the pathogen into the sewer system. Logically, pathogens excreted in urine and feces will be released several times during a 24-h period. Enteric and respiratory pathogens are almost always detected in sewage because of the long duration of release from the host during infection, the large concentrations released from the host, and the many infections that are asymptomatic.

Table 9.9

Comparative occurrence of enteric agents (category B) in feces and sewage

Agent(s)Feces (per gram)StoolaSewage (100 ml)
Enteric viruses (infectivity assay)1081010102
Enteric viruses (PCR assay)1010–10121012–1014104–105
Giardia10610810–102
Cryptosporidium1061080.1-102

a100 g stool (150 g average in the U.S.).

Studies have shown that the types and concentration of enteric microorganisms in sewage is directly related to the incidence of disease in the community (Riordan, 1962Sellwood et al., 1981). The concentration of enteric pathogens in sewage ranges from 0.1 to 100,000 per ml of sewage (Table 9.8). While many biological agents of interest have been detected in sewage (Table 9.3), the studies are limited and vary by location.Go to:

IV. LABORATORY METHODS AND DETECTION

A. Detection of pathogens

Culture based methods can be used for the detection of pathogens in wastewater, but they may take days to weeks to perform. Alternative molecular methods, such as the PCR, have been successful in detecting bacterial, viral, and protozoan pathogens in sewage without the need for cultivation (Gilbride et al., 2006). These new techniques detect live and dead organisms, have a high sensitivity for wastewater, and can reduce detection time to a few hours (He and Jiang, 2005Holmes, 2003). Some promising new wastewater methods use nucleic acid microarrays or antibody/receptor technologies to detect multiple pathogens simultaneously (Boehm et al., 2007). Combining these multiplexed methods with fiberoptic sensors and lab-on-a-chip technology can allow utilities to rapidly screen, identify, and quantify multiple pathogens in real time.

Because these technologies rely on PCR DNA techniques, the many interfering substances in raw sewage pose a problem. Without proper sample extraction, the sample analytes are exposed to many varying inhibitors, which can negatively impact the DNA isolation and amplification steps. These methods are also limited by their inability to differentiate between viable and nonviable or nonculturable organisms ( Josephson et al., 1993), a vital characteristic when assessing the microbial risk assessment for any given community.

Certain methods are in development to automate the sample collection, sample processing, and concentration to separate analytes from inhibitors and deliver a suitable clean sample to a real-time detection microarray technology. These methods use latex beads, carbohydrates, anion exchange resins, or similar substances as part of sample collection and sample processing step (Straub and Chandler, 2003), but no fully automated method has been proposed for wastewater. A biosensor capable of identifying and quantifying a wide group of pathogens is necessary, but future development is needed in the areas of extraction from environmental samples, selection of a suitable target sequence of the pathogen (specificity), detection and differentiation of the signal from interfering sequences (sensitivity), and automation of all processes towards a functional real-time biosensor for wastewater (Gilbride et al., 2006).

B. Survival of pathogens in sewer systems

A principal benefit of wastewater monitoring is that most pathogens of interest are expected to remain viable for at least several days in the sewerage environment (Table 9.10 ). Enteric and respiratory agents are particularly stable, while data is limited for viral encephalitis agents because transmission in water and other liquid media does not occur naturally. Using molecular methods, survival of the pathogens in the viable form is not necessary for their detection, thus increasing the length of time for which the pathogen may be detected. In the case of select agents, knowing the presence of the organism in the sewer system may be all that is needed to trigger further investigation regardless of viability.

Table 9.10

The Helsinki poliovirus experiment (Ranta et al., 2001)

Helsinki population = 740,000
Sewage flow 2 × 108 l/day
Contamination Event
5 × 1010 TCID50 Poliovirus vaccine
Flushed down toilet in one liter volume
20 km from sewage treatment plant
Detection
Automatic sampler = 200 ml per 5 × 106 liters of sewage flow
Four samples pooled per day
Concentrated from 400 to 1 ml before assay
Result
Virus was detected for the next 4 days (cell culture)
Peak 24–48 h after flush
Virus detected after passage of 800 million liters of sewage pass through system
Conclusion
Monitoring of sewage could detect 1 infected person in 10,000
Assumes:
108 infectious virus excreted by child in 4 days

C. Lessons learned from poliovirus: Monitoring as an early warning system

The benefits of pathogen monitoring in sewage have been recognized for poliovirus for more than 40 years. The relationship between the occurrence of poliovirus in sewage and clinical incidence of disease in a community was first noted in the late 1960s (Nelson et al., 1967). These early detection studies were designed as longitudinal epidemiological investigations to assess the success of polio vaccination campaigns (Riordan, 1962). The results of these studies demonstrated that a definite correlation exists among the isolation of enteroviruses in sewage, and the isolation of viruses in stools, and the number of recognized clinical cases within the community. Using cell culture assay techniques (which measure only infective viruses) and only grab samples (i.e., no steps to concentrate the sample) poliovirus could be detected when only 0.27–0.4% of the population was excreting the virus. It was also demonstrated that small outbreaks and epidemics of enterovirus and adenovirus disease within a community can be predicted by monitoring a community’s sewage. Virulent or wildtype (nonvaccine strain) poliovirus type 1 was detected in sewage 9 days before the first clinical case became evident (Kuwert et al., 1970). In an outbreak of Coxsackievirus B5, the virus was detected in the sewage 10 days before clinical cases were positive (Nelson et al., 1967). These studies make it clear that grab samples collected on a regular (weekly or every few days) basis could be used to assess the introduction of a new infectious agent in the community. This approach was later adapted to monitor the success of poliovirus vaccine campaigns internationally (WHO, 2003).

To assess the sensitivity of poliovirus monitoring, one study (Ranta et al., 2001) flushed a one-time bolus of 11 containing 2 × 1010 infective poliovirus type 1 vaccine strain down a toilet 20 km (12 miles) from the sewage plant (Table 9.11 ). Samples were automatically collected and assayed for the next 4 days. Infectious poliovirus was still detected after 800 million liters had passed through the system. The authors concluded that their monitoring system could detect one infected person in 10,000 residents of the community, assuming that 108 infective viruses are excreted by a child over a 4-day period of time. The study showed that pathogens appear to be greatly retarded in sewage systems, where a onetime event resulted in a detection period over 4 days. The pathogen was also easily detected in 200-ml samples for every 5 × 1061 of sewage flow.

Table 9.11

Survival time of pathogens in the environment (water, feces, urine, sewage) (Belanov et al., 1996Belshe, 1991Mitscherlich and Marth, 1984Sinclair et al., 2008)

OrganismDays of survival
B. anthracisWeeks to years
C. botulinumWeeks
Y. pestisDays
Variola major (smallpox)Weeks to months
F. tularensis12–60 days
Marburg virus (surfaces)4–5 days
Enteric pathogensDays to months
B. mallei28–35 days
Psittacosis (C. psittaci)Days
Q fever (C. burnetti)30–1000 days
Typhus fever (Rickettsia typhi)Hours to days
Influenza (surfaces)3 days

Surveillance of poliovirus in sewage has been used by several nations to assess the success of vaccination programs and to identify the potential need for vaccination to prevent outbreaks (Deshpande et al., 2003Manor et al., 1999Tambini et al., 1993). The World Health Organization has published guidelines for the environmental surveillance of poliovirus circulation (WHO, 2003). These guidelines assume that a single infected person will excrete 107 polioviruses per day and that one person infected in 100 could be detected using an infectivity assay without concentrating the sewage. However, if the tested sample is concentrated 100 fold then one infected person among 10,000 could be detected.

The Public Health Laboratories of Israel have been conducting an environmental surveillance of sewage on a monthly basis since 1989 (Manor et al., 1999) to assess the spread of the wild type poliovirus strains capable of causing paralytic disease. This was done to determine the success and need for vaccination programs. Between 1989 and 1998, four “silent” separate episodes of wild-type poliovirus circulation were detected when no clinical cases were observed. The study described how surveillance of the sewage is much more effective than surveillance of clinical cases. The greater sensitivity of sewage surveillance was also validated in Mumbai, India where wild type poliovirus was detected 3 months before any clinical cases were observed (Deshpande et al., 2003).

D. Differentiation of vaccine and virulent strains

In the poliovirus surveillance of sewage it is necessary to differentiate between vaccine strains and wild type strains of the virus. In the past this has been accomplished by using different cell lines or incubation conditions to limit the growth of the vaccine strains. However, today this can be accomplished by the use of molecular methods and sequence analysis. Sequences amplified directly from processed sewage samples by PCR using primer pairs specific for the indigenous type 1 genotype could be used to assess its occurrence in the presence of vaccine strains (Tambini et al., 1993). Vaccine strains have unique sequences from wild type strains of pathogens allowing easy differentiation. In addition, sequence analysis of sewage isolations has been shown useful in tracking the spread of wild type poliovirus from one country and community to another (Deshpande et al., 2003Manor et al., 1999). This review of poliovirus is offered here as a case study and justification for the use of monitoring additional CDC select biological agents. With current molecular techniques and updated concentration methods, a much greater sensitivity and specificity can be achieved for poliovirus and many other CDC select agents.Go to:

V. CONCLUSIONS: THE PROBABILITY OF DETECTION

Studies with poliovirus demonstrated the feasibility of how monitoring sewage for virulent pathogens can be used to assess the success of vaccine programs. This review identified three important benefits of developing a wastewater monitoring system. Sewage surveillance system has been shown to be more sensitive than reporting of clinical cases of serious illness in a community. It was also demonstrated that pathogens can be greatly retarded in a sewage systems allowing a detection time over many days for a one-time release into a sewage system. Finally, it was shown that infectivity assays have the ability to detect one infected person in 10,000 individuals.

Sewage surveillance can detect the presence or increased amount of infections from enteric pathogens excreted in the feces or urine during infection. However, the success of such a surveillance system for nonenteric pathogens has not been demonstrated, although they have been found in sewage. The sensitivity of a sewage surveillance system will depend on several important factors including the amount and duration of the agent released into the sewers, the frequency of monitoring, and the sensitivity of the monitoring method.

Nonenteric pathogens are released from the host for a minimum of several days. This has already been demonstrated for HIV, hepatitis B, and Y. pestis (see Tables 9.2 and IV). Given this fact and the expected several day retardation in sewer systems, all or most of the nonenteric category agents will be present in the sewer system if there is an infection in the population served by the sewer system. Based upon the conclusions of the Helsinki experiment, which measured infectious poliovirus (Table 9.11), one individual excreting 108 infectious virus per gram of feces for a period of 4 days could be identified in a population of 10,000. If we consider the concentration and amount of infectious agent in the fluid or feces released during infection, this same sensitivity should be achieved with the agents of smallpox, Brucella, botulism and perhaps influenza. Based on existing information in Table 9.5 at least one person in 100 could be detected for most of the agents for which information is available.

Because many of the agents take several days to detect by conventional culture methods the preferred detection system would be by a rapid, but highly specific method such as the quantitative real time PCR or other similar molecular detection system. Because PCR can detect both culturable and nonculturable organisms, it can be expected to be more sensitive than methods that have been used in the past for sewage surveillance. Use of PCR should increase sensitivity by as much as 50,000 over cultivation methods (Ward et al., 1984). Also, when using PCR to detect viruses in sewage, a 10-fold loss in sensitivity is likely with current methods. This loss is due to interfering substances present in the sewage, but still leaves a method that may be 5000 times more sensitive than conventional culture methods. Increasing the volume of wastewater that is tested may also increase the sensitivity of current methods. Technology is available (Hurst and Crawford, 2002) which allows for the concentration of bacteria and viruses from up to 10 l of raw sewage. Thus, increasing the volume analyzed from 400 to 4000 ml could increase the sensitivity of detection another 10-fold.

Surveillance of pathogens in wastewater has several advantages over aerosol and other monitoring methods. Longer survival times in soil, water, and wastewater (Sinclair et al., 2008) facilitate a retardation of pathogens in sewage which allows a longer sampling window than aerosols where organisms are much more susceptible to factors such as settling, desiccation, and relative humidity. Additionally, wastewater is collected in a central location, allowing monitoring to be defined or subdivided to specific areas. Lastly, wastewater systems can include many pathogens originating in aerosol, surface water, tap water, or fomites as storm-water and watersheds will often flow into sewerage systems.

Of course background levels and alert levels of the agents of interest would have to be established. Most agents of interest are likely to occur at one time or another in wastewater or at least have some normal range of background. Further research would be needed to determine what these levels might be and normal variation of concentrations of the agents in wastewater. The types and concentration would be expected to vary by location and the size of the population, area served and type of connections (e.g., the presence of a slaughterhouse may increase the likelihood of finding animal pathogens).

In summary, given the potential enhanced sensitivity of molecular methods and current abilities to test larger volumes of all of the CDC select agents of interest (enteric and nonenteric), it is possible to detect if an infected individual enters a monitored population. Although the concentration and duration of release of all of the agents of interest are not known, it is still possible to detect at least one infection in populations of 1000 or more. This monitoring is especially useful when combined with other components of the QMRA framework such as modeling of sewage dispersion, back calculation of contaminant point of introduction, and calculations of the health risk.Go to:

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This study was supported by the United States Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, the Center for Advancing Microbial Risk Assessment funded by the United States Environmental Protection Agency Science to Achieve Results, and the United States Department of Homeland Security University Programs grant number R3236201. Ryan Sinclair was supported through the National Research Council’s Research Associate Program with funding from the United Sates Department of Homeland Security.Go to:

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TOXIC ZOMBIE DEVELOPMENTS

The Vast Poisoning of America’s Groundwater

From the Old Days of exposing the TOXIC AQUIFERS


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The Heart of Harris and Montgomery CountyTX. Conroe. https://americalooted.wordpress.com/america-looted-mud-money/ … See more videos of trillions stolen bank looting judson witham … There was an oilfield road located on the tract.


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Nov 19, 2019 – Conroe, November 19 – Kelli Cook, Publisher of The Golden Hammer, Montgomery County’s … to the citizens of Montgomery County and of Texas to provide them with the … Art Roshner and Judson Witham with a few others STARTED THE … https://americalooted.wordpress.com/the-houston-con-mud…/.Missing: 


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… The Houston CON / Mud Flats 101 · The Magical Vanishing TRILLIONS and the Trump Princess … For TRILLIONS ( by Judson Witham ) https://vimeo.com/125739752 … 650 Just in Montgomery County have been SECRETED … the TEXAS OILFIELD WARS and RANGE WARS, and move forward to the Texas Rent a Bank …


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The Government Did It. For Texas and The Golden Hammer of MONKEY COUNTY TEXAS Read It and Weep … READ THAT A FEW TIMES Montgomery County ….. HELLO Dirt Road Land … The Houston CON / Mud Flats 101 | Trillions Stolen … … ASK … Texas KING of Bank Looting and Land Fraud. from Witham Judson.

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Texas Town Welcomes Toxic Hudson River Sludge | National … … Sep 28, 2016 · Reality proves JUDSON WITHAM has always been SPOT … … FDIC , FBI, DOJ, State of Texas ( Conroe, Montgomery County ) from Nelda Luce Radabaugh Blair, Marcus Winberry, Jimmie … There was an oilfield road located on the tract.

The Immense Poisoning of America ….. The Great Sell Out

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